The Savings Directive has been celebrated as a major political break-through in coordinating taxation in Europe. Against this background, the present paper evaluates the real-world effects of this directive. The directive has left a loophole by providing grandfathering (exemption from withholding tax) for some securities. In this paper we compare the pre-tax returns of exempt bonds and comparable taxable bonds. If working around the Savings Directive is difficult for tax evaders in Europe, then investors should be willing to pay a premium for bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate. Conversely, if such a premium is absent, then we may conclude that the supply of existing loopholes (exempt bonds included) is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at no additional cost. The findings of our study are in line with this latter interpretation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the EU, coordinated action in the area of direct taxation is difficult to achieve and few measures have been adopted in the past. A recent exception is the "Directive on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments", more commonly known as the "Savings Directive" (European Community 2003/48/EC). The ultimate aim of this directive is to allow member states of the EU to tax interest income of resident individuals if they earn interest income abroad. Without cross-border coordination between states, a large portion of interest income earned abroad may be concealed by taxpayers and the taxation of interest becomes highly incomplete.
Against this background, the agreement on the Savings Directive has been celebrated as a major breakthrough.
1 As of 1 st July 2005, the directive requires a member state A to electronically report to the country of residence B when an individual resident in B is paid interest income by a bank in A. An exception applies for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg.
For a (potentially indefinite) intermediate period, these member states are exempt from providing information exchange, unless the foreign investor consents. Instead, these countries have to levy a withholding tax on interest income paid to residents in other member states, 75% of which has to be forwarded to the relevant countries of residence, but without revealing the identity of the interest recipient. This agreement became effective only after equivalent arrangements have been negotiated with third countries (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San
Marino, and Switzerland) and overseas and associated territories, like the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and the Netherlands Germany, and where taxpayers take out a tax credit for withholding taxes paid abroad.
In this paper we study the availability of loopholes by measuring the cost that taxpayers are willing to incur to take advantage of a particular loophole provided by the savings directive. According to Article 15 of the directive, negotiable bonds that have been issued before 1 st March 2001 are exempt from the withholding tax as long as Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg use withholding taxes instead of providing information exchange. 4 The preamble of the directive justifies this exception by the objective to avoid possible "market disruptions." This "grandfathering" of older bonds makes these securities the preferred choice for tax dodgers: in the absence of further taxation in the country of residence, these investors will prefer the bonds that are exempt from the withholding rates over bonds that are taxed or bonds that are deposited at banks in countries that provide information exchange.
The present paper investigates whether the securities that qualify for this grandfathering rule have experienced a decrease in pre-tax return that may reflect the additional demand of tax evaders. If other loopholes are costly, then dishonest taxpayers will be willing to accept a lower before tax return on grandfathered securities that allow avoidance of the withholding tax rate compared to securities that are subject to the withholding tax.
Whether dishonest taxpayers who consider shifting towards grandfathered bonds indeed have to accept a gross return that falls short of bonds that do not qualify for grandfathering of course depends also on the magnitudes of supply and demand for the tax-favored bonds. In any case, absence of tax effects for the differential returns on grandfathered and nongrandfathered bonds should suggest that existing loopholes are wide enough to render the current version of the Savings Directive ineffective.
While there has been an extensive discussion of the Savings Directive among public finance economists, the question put forward in the present paper has to the best of our Grinblatt and Titman 2002 , Poterba 1989 , and Gordon and Malkiel 1981 . Due to the fact that the returns of municipal bonds are not subject to tax for US investors, the return of these bonds is empirically found to be smaller than the before tax return of other securities. In the present case, the tax effects may be less pronounced as bonds that fall under the grandfathering rule create a tax benefit to an arguably smaller group of taxpayers, those that are tax dodgers. Unlike in the U.S. case, institutional investors are not affected as the withholding tax (and the information exchange) is limited to the case of personal investors.
Essentially, the question of whether the withholding tax is relevant for asset returns is therefore an empirical question.
II. The Data Set
In collecting our data set we started by considering a huge set of interest bearing securities that have been in circulation in mid-2007. The data set we started with contains all negotiable securities (in total 6,013) that at this date could be ordered via publicly owned banks (Sparkassen) in Germany. This compares to a total of 18,387 securities that were traded in Germany according to Deutsche Börse (2006) . Among the 6,013 securities in our data set we identified 1,006 grandfathered bonds denominated in euro. In a next step we constructed pairs (twins) of similar bonds that ideally differ only in the fact that one part of each pair is grandfathered (i.e., not subject to the 15% withholding tax rate that according to the Savings Directive must be retained by Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg), while the other is not.
While this necessarily implies that one part of each twin was issued earlier than the other one to receive preferential treatment under the grandfathering rule, we made sure that other characteristics of the pairs are comparable. In particular, we imposed the following restrictions. (i) Each pair must have been issued by the same institution or firm. (ii) To involve the same risk characteristics, both securities had to be denominated in the same currency. We decided to restrict our sample to pairs of twins issued in euro as this is the and we imposed the restriction of similar maturity, we are dependent on issuers who subsequent to the issue of a grandfathered bond have also given out a comparable bond with shorter maturity. Figure 1 reports the differences in the maturity within twins. As can be seen, most differences in maturities lie in a 50 days band and the distribution is rather symmetric. This suggests that any yield curve effects, which may produce a systematic higher or lower yield for securities with a longer maturity, should not systematically influence the return difference among our twins.
III. Evidence on Return Differences
As mentioned in the introduction, if tax evaders happen to be the marginal traders of securities, then we would expect that tax exempt securities trade at a premium and pay a lower pre-tax return. More formally, let r gf be the pre-tax return of a grandfathered bond and r tw the return of its taxable twin. Then we would expect that a trader who cannot escape the withholding tax t, but can evade other taxes is indifferent if
With a withholding rate of 15% we would have that the return of the taxable twin could be 17.6% = [1/(1 -15%)] -1 higher than that of the grandfathered bond. Clearly, forward looking investors will not only consider the actual withholding tax, but will anticipate future taxes, leading to possible tax capitalization effects well ahead of the actual introduction. This calls for an account of the path that led to the directive and the grandfathering rule.
The first concrete proposals towards a withholding tax on cross-border interest in
Europe was formulated in 1989 in Commission proposal COM (89) 60 final, which suggested a minimum withholding rate of 15%, but without mentioning of grandfathering. Upon strong concerns about capital flight, the proposal was withdrawn in favor of COM (98) Figure 2 give summary information on the empirical yield differences in our sample. As reported in Table 1 , the overall mean return of grandfathered bonds, measured by the redemption yield, in our sample was 3.698%. 6 The mean yield for the twin securities was only 2.5 basis points lower and the difference between yields did not change for the returns from July 2005 onwards, when the Savings Directive was fully effective. Figure 2 gives a more detailed picture over time by plotting the mean, the median, the 25 th centile and Annotation: For each pair of twins, the variable diff is defined as the pre-tax return (redemption yield) of the non-grandfathered security minus the pre-tax return of the grandfathered security. These differences in returns are plotted against the left scale for the 25 th centile, the median, the mean, and the 75 th centile for each quarter. The total number of pairs in each quarter is plotted on the right hand scale. Column (1) reports results from a simple OLS. While both time dummies for the post legislation periods are significant, they both have the wrong sign and are small in economic terms. The results are very similar in column 2, which reports results that have been derived by using fixed effects for each pair of twins. In both cases, the error terms show a high degree of serial correlation. Therefore, columns (3) - (7) report regressions with inclusion of two lags of the dependent variable. 7 Inclusion of two lagged dependent variables makes the estimated effect of the time window dummies smaller and insignificant. At the same time, it resolves the problem of first order autocorrelation in the errors. We also tried to include a third lag of the endogenous variable, but found this third lag to be insignificant. When we include lagged endogenous variables the F-test also allows to drop the dummies for each pair. The last three regressions therefore drop these dummies and we also use the acceptable restriction that the coefficients for III03_II05 and post_II05 are the same. Equations (5) - (7) use the dummy post_II03, which takes on the value one for observations from July 2003. Equation (6) shown that our endogenous variable shows some outliers with extreme values up to 1.395 and as low as 0.583, we also tested a robust estimation. Equation ( Taken together, neither the observed return differences of taxable vs. exempt bonds as reported in Table 1 , nor the difference in difference estimates reported in Table 2 are commensurate with an effect of the Savings Directive on bond returns. 
IV. Conclusions
The Savings Directive has been celebrated as a major break-through in coordinating taxation in Europe. Against this background, the present paper evaluated the real-world effects of this directive. The directive has left one explicit loophole by providing grandfathering (exemption from withholding tax) for some securities. In this paper we have compared the pre-tax returns of these exempt bonds and comparable taxable bonds. If working around the Savings Directive is difficult for tax evaders in Europe, then investors should be willing to pay a premium for bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate. Conversely, if such a premium is absent, then we may conclude that the supply of existing loopholes (exempt bonds included) is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at negligible additional cost. The findings of our study are in line with this latter interpretation. This suggests that, at least so far, the Savings Directive is only a minor hassle for European savers looking for ways to work around interest income taxation. This stands in striking contrast to the considerable bureaucratic and political efforts that have been exerted to introduce the measures taken. As a caveat, it should be noted that grandfathering will end at December 31 st , 2010. At least, this will close the loophole that has acted as a litmus test in the present study.
